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INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION INCLUDED OFFENSES:
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT ACTUAL
PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER
THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL IS A LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF DRIVING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL
State v. Huber, 555 N.W.2d 791 (N.D. 1996)
I. FACTS
On August 4, 1995, a deputy sheriff observed a pickup on the side
of Mercer County Road Twenty-One.' The deputy saw the pickup move
forward but could not identify the person driving. 2 After approaching
the vehicle, the deputy noticed that Benjamin Huber was in the driver's
seat and that the engine was running. 3 Two other people were at the
scene, and both stated that Huber had not been driving.4 The deputy
tested Huber's sobriety and arrested him for driving a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol (DUI).5
On the day of Huber's trial, the prosecutor requested that the jury
instructions regarding the elements of a DUI be amended to include "or
was in actual physical control of' a motor vehicle. 6 Over Huber's
objection, the lower court amended the jury instructions.7 The amended
instructions provided that the state needed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Huber "did operate or was in actual physical control of' a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.8 However, the state
1. State v. Huber, 555 N.W.2d 791, 793 (N.D. 1996).
2. Id.
3. Id. The deputy also observed that Huber and the person standing outside the pickup were
arguing. Id.
4. Id. The two additional witnesses asserted that Huber moved to the driver's seat after the
driver stepped out of the vehicle. Id.
5. Id. In North Dakota, the DUI statute, in pertinent part, provides:
A person may not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or
upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in
this state if any of the following apply:
b. That person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(l)(b) (1997). This statute provides for two different offenses, driving
while under the influence of alcohol (DUI), and being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol (APC). See State v. Jacobson, 338 N.W.2d 648, 650 (N.D. 1983)
(noting that the use of the word "or" between "drive" and "be in actual physical control of"
evidenced the North Dakota Legislature's intent to create two different offenses).
6. Huber, 555 N.W.2d at 793. The initial jury instructions provided that the prosecution satisfied
its burden if it proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Huber "did operate a motor vehicle" while
under the influence of alcohol. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:787
did not amend the complaint, and the lower court did not modify the
verdict forms to add a possible verdict of guilty of actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (APC).9
The jury subsequently convicted Huber of DUI, and Huber appealed,
arguing that the lower court erred in amending the jury instructions to
include APC.10 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that APC is a
lesser included offense of DUI and that inadequate jury instructions
violated Huber's right to due process of law.ll
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Generally, a lesser included offense is defined as an offense which is
composed of some of the elements of a greater offense so that it is im-
possible to commit the greater offense without committing the lesser
offense.12 For instance, a jurisdiction might provide for the crime of un-
lawful entry and also include unlawful entry as an element of the crime
of burglary which carries a greater punishment.13 A person consequent-
ly could not commit burglary without committing unlawful entry.14
Unlawful entry would then be a lesser included offense of burglary.15
Under N.D. CENT. CODE Section 12.1-01-04(15), an "included of-
fense" is one which can be proven by the same or less than all the facts
required to prove the offense charged. The included offense is com-
posed of an attempt or solicitation to commit, or differs from the offense
charged only because it constitutes a lesser harm or risk of harm. 16 Rule
31(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure similarly pro-
9. Id. Thus, the verdict forms provided for only two possible verdicts; guilty of DUI or not guilty
of DUI. Id. at 797.
10. Id. at 793.
11. Id. at 798.
12. Giles v. United States, 144 F.2d 860, 861 (lst Cir. 1944); see also Christen R. Blair, Constitu-
tional Limitations on the Lesser Included Offense Doctrine, 21 AM. C RIM. L. REV. 445, 447-51 (1984)
(describing three approaches to the lesser included offense doctrine).
13. See generally David E. Rigney, Annotation, Propriety of Lesser-Included-Offense Charge to
Jury in Federal Prosecution for Crime Involving Property Rights, 105 A.L.R. FED. 669 (1991).
14. Id.
15. See Giles v. United States, 144 F.2d at 861.
16. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-04(15) (1997). The statute, in its entirety, provides:
Included offense means an offense:
a. Which is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish commission of the offense charged;
b. Which consists of criminal facilitation of or an attempt or solicitation to commit
the offense charged; or
c. Which differed from the offense charged only in that it constitutes a less serious
harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest, or because
a lesser degree of culpability suffices to establish its commission.
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vides that a defendant may be convicted of an offense "necessarily
included" in the offense charged. 17
In accord with these provisions, the North Dakota Supreme Court
has held that when a defendant is charged with a greater offense, the
defendant is put on notice that he or she might also have to defend
against a lesser included offense.1 8 More specifically, the Constitution's
Due Process Clause does not require a state to amend a complaint in
order to charge an individual with a lesser included offense.19 Jury in-
structions on a lesser included offense which "correctly and adequate-
ly" advise the jury of the appropriate law are the only additional require-
ments necessary for the conviction of a defendant for a lesser included
offense. 20 The instructions may be requested by either the defendant or
the prosecution when the evidence creates reasonable doubt in terms of
the greater offense but no reasonable doubt of the lesser included
offense. 21
The North Dakota Supreme Court has frequently referred to the
"lesser included offense" in the context of cases involving APC and
DUI.22 In a 1983 decision, State v. Klose, the North Dakota Supreme
Court suggested that APC was a lesser included offense of DUI.23 In
Klose, the defendant was originally charged with DUI, but he moved to
amend the complaint to reflect only a charge of APC.24 The lower court
granted the defendant's motion and the defendant plead guilty to
APC.25 The court held that by amending a DUI charge to a charge of
17. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 31(c). Specifically, the rule provides:
(c) Conviction of lesser offense. The defendant may be found guilty of an offense
necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense
charged or an offense necessarily included therein if the attempt is an offense.
Id.
18. State v. Vance, 537 N.W.2d 545, 548 (N.D. 1995).
19. State v. Stoppleworth, 442 N.W.2d 415, 417 (N.D. 1989); see also Blair, supra note 12, at
451-55 (analyzing the constitutional requirements of a lesser included offense conviction).
20. State v. Azure, 525 N.W.2d 654, 658 ( N.D. 1994).
21. Vance, 537 N.W.2d at 548 (citing State v. Sheldon, 301 N.W.2d 604, 608 (N.D. 1980)
(holding that either the prosecutor or the defendant may request a jury instruction on a lesser included
offense)); State v. Jacobson, 338 N.W.2d 648, 651 (N.D. 1983) (citing State v. Piper, 261 N.W.2d 650,
654 (N.D. 1978) (holding that a jury instruction on a lesser included offense is appropriate where the
jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and not guilty of the greater
offense)).
22. See State v. Klose, 334 N.W.2d 647, 650 (N.D. 1983) (holding that the issue in the case did
not involve the lower court's authority to find the defendant guilty of a lesser included offense); Jacob-
son, 338 N.W.2d at 650 (holding that APC was not a lesser included offense of DUI). In addition to
DUI and APC, context the lesser included offense doctrine has been used in many other contexts. See
generally Rigney, supra note 13 (discussing use of the lesser included offense doctrine in robbery,
burglary, and similar cases).
23. See Klose, 334 N.W.2d at 650 (referring to APC as a clear reduction in charge from DUI).
24. Id. at 648.
25. Id. The state then successfully moved to vacate the judgment, and the original DUI charge
was reinstated. Id. The defendant again moved to amend the complaint to charge only APC, but a
19981 789
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APC, the trial judge had "clearly reduced the offense." 26 Thus, the
court apparently considered APC to be a lesser offense than DUI.27
The court further indicated that APC was a lesser included offense
when it noted that the lower court could not have determined that the
admitted evidence was insufficient to support DUI, but sufficient to
support a lesser included offense.2 8 Accordingly, the court concluded
that the issue in the case did not involve the lower court's authority to
find a defendant guilty of a lesser included offense.2 9 As such, although
the court never heard a lesser included offense argument, the court's
dicta implied that such an argument might be appropriate in some DUI
cases.30
Later in 1983, the court first heard the argument that APC was a les-
ser included offense of DUI.31 In State v. Jacobson, 3 2 a highway patrol
officer observed the defendant drive over several parking lot barriers and
arrested him for DUI.33 At trial, the defendant requested a jury in-
struction addressing APC as a lesser included offense of DUI, but the
trial court denied the request. 34 In affirming the trial court's decision,
the court held that APC did not qualify as a lesser included offense of
DUI.35
specially appointed judge concluded that the court had improperly amended the complaint the first
time. Id. However, the appointed judge dismissed the DUI charge, reasoning that the defendant had
been placed in jeopardy because the court had accepted his guilty plea on the APC offense. Id.
26. Id. at 649. "The amendment clearly reduced the offense and as a result charged a different
offense than the one set forth in the initial complaint. This is precisely what the rules do not permit."
Id. (referring to rules 3(b) and 7(e) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
implication that the language of the two rules does not suggest that the "court on its own or at the
request of the defendant without the concurrence of the prosecution, may amend the complaint or
information").
27. Id. Logically, if an offense is reduced it is lesser than the original offense. However, a
lesser offense is not necessarily a lesser included offense. See Giles v. United States, 144 F.2d 860,
861 (1st Cir. 1944) (providing the "included" requirement, namely that a lesser included offense is
necessarily committed if the greater offense is committed).
28. Klose, 334 N.W.2d at 650. The court recognized that "a court in a criminal bench trial may
find the defendant guilty of a lesser offense." Id. However, the court noted that no trial took place
and that the lower court failed to follow Rule 11 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure
regarding the acceptance of a guilty plea. Id. (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. I1).
29. Id. The court specifically held that the lower court had violated Rule 3(b) of the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that the "magistrate may permit a complaint to be
amended at any time before a finding or verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and if
the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." Id. at 649 (quoting N.D. R. CRIM. P. 3(b)).
30. See id. at 649, 650 (mentioning the lesser included offense issue even though neither party
raised a lesser included offense argument and, thus, suggesting that one could legitimately raise the
argument that APC is a lesser included offense of DUI).
31. See State v. Jacobson, 338 N.W.2d 648, 649-50 (N.D. 1983) (recognizing that the issue was
whether the lower court erred in denying the petitioner's request for a jury instruction that APC was a
lesser included offense of DUI).
32. 338 N.W.2d 648 (N.D. 1983).
33. State v. Jacobson, 338 N.W.2d 648, 649 (N.D. 1983).
34. Id. at 649-50. The jury then convicted the defendant of DUI. Id. at 651.
35. Id. at 650.
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The court defined a lesser included offense as an offense with the
same or fewer elements than the greater offense and which carried a les-
ser punishment than the greater offense. 36 The court required the poten-
tial lesser included offense, APC, to satisfy two tests; the "included
offense" test and the "lesser offense" test.37 To satisfy the included of-
fense test, the offense must have the same or fewer elements than the
greater offense. 38 To satisfy the lesser offense test, the offense must car-
ry a lesser punishment. 39 The court concluded that APC met the includ-
ed offense test since one could not drive without being in actual physical
control. 40 However, the court determined that APC did not meet the
lesser offense test since the criminal penalties for DUI and APC were the
same. 4 1 Consequently, the court determined that APC was not a lesser
included offense of DUI.42
However, the court in Jacobson noted that APC was not appropriate
under the circumstances regardless of whether it was a lesser included
offense of DUI.43 The court held that instruction on a lesser included of-
fense is justified when the evidence "creates a reasonable doubt as to the
greater or primary offense and supports a conviction of the lesser includ-
ed offense." 44 The evidence in the case consisted solely of the arresting
officer's observations of the defendant driving his vehicle. 45 As such,
since the evidence created reasonable doubt as to DUI, the evidence
necessarily created reasonable doubt as to APC as well. 4 6 Thus, the court






41. Id. at 651. The court found that assessing points to one's driver's license was an administra-
tive or civil penalty. Id. It reasoned that the point system provided for suspension of licenses through
administrative proceedings. Id. The court further noted that the defendant "presented no authority in
support of his contention that APC is a lesser included offense of DUI," and that it was unaware of
any "authority holding that civil or administrative penalties are considered in determining if the of-
fense is a lesser included offense." Id. at 650-51. The court consequently held that administrative or
civil penalties are not considered in determining if an offense meets the lesser offense test. Id. at 651.
42. Id. at 650. Thus, the court held that the lower court did not err in denying the defendant's
request for a lesser included offense instruction. Id. at 651.
43. Id. The court initially stated that it did not have to decide the issue of whether driver's license
point assessments could be used in determining whether APC was a lesser offense than DUI. Id. at
650. After holding that the point assessments could not be used, the court returned to its initial state-
ment and reasoned that it did not matter whether APC was a lesser included offense of DUI. Id. at
651.
44. Id. (quoting State v. Piper, 261 N.W.2d 650, 654 (N.D. 1978)). The federal courts use similar
criteria to determine when jury instructions on a lesser included offense are appropriate. See Rigney,
supra note 13, at 481 (examining the tests used by federal courts in assessing the propriety of lesser
included offense instructions).
45. Jacobson, 338 N.W.2d at 651.
46. Id. In other words, the evidence of APC was exactly the same as the evidence of DUI.
47. Id.
1998]
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Also in 1983, the North Dakota Legislature amended the DUI/APC
statute by providing for suspension of sentence for APC convictions but
not for DUI convictions. 48 Previously, the DUI/APC statute provided the
same criminal penalty for DUI and APC.49 By creating unequal criminal
penalties, the legislators likely intended to foster plea bargaining in the
DUI/APC context, and thereby intended for APC to be a lesser offense
than DUI.50
In 1993, the court recognized this difference in penalties in State v.
Schuh.51 In Schuh, a deputy sheriff found the defendant "slumped
over" the steering wheel of her car which was stuck in a patch of trees. 52
The state initially charged the defendant with DUI but later amended the
complaint to include APC.53 The jury then found the defendant guilty
of APC.54 Arguing that DUI and APC were different offenses and that
the amended complaint prejudiced her right to a fair trial, the defendant
moved for a new trial.55 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
granting of a new trial.56 The court reasoned that DUI and APC address
different conduct and have different elements. 57 Moreover, the court
noted that the Legislature provided for suspension of sentences only for
APC convictions. 58 Therefore, the court concluded that the amended
complaint added a new offense and prejudiced the defendant's right to a
48. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4)(e)(1) (1997). The statute reads as
follows:
e. The execution or imposition of sentence under this section may not be suspended or
deferred under subsection 3 or 4 of Section 12.1-32-02 except that a fine or a
sentence of imprisonment may be suspended in any of the following instances:
(1) Upon conviction of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in
violation of this section or equivalent ordinance.
Id.
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(2) (1981). However, the civil penalties differed; an APC viola-
tion resulted in the assessment of six driver's license points while a DUI violation resulted in the assess-
ment of fifteen driver's license points. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-10(3)(b)(5)-(6) (1981).
50. Senate Judicial Conference Comm. on S.B. 2373, 48th Legis. (N.D. 1983). Representative
Pat Conmy felt that the amendment would "have an affect on physical control and plea bargaining."
Id. Senator John M. Olson also discussed plea bargaining from DUI to APC. Id. More specifically,
Senator Olson and Representative Conmy "discussed ... plea bargaining with physical control as the
answer sometimes." Id. Since plea bargaining involves a defendant exchanging a guilty plea for a
lesser charge or penalty, the legislators must have perceived APC as satisfying the lesser offense test.
See Jacobson, 338 N.W.2d at 650 (holding that a lesser included offense must pass both a lesser
offense test and an included offense test).
51. 496 N.W.2d 41, 45 (N.D. 1993).
52. State v. Schuh, 496 N.W.2d 41, 42 (N.D. 1993).
53. Id. at 43.
54. Id.
55. Id. In support of the argument, the defendant cited Klose. Id. (citing State v. Klose, 334
N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1983)).
56. Id. at 46.
57. Id. at 45.
58. Id. at 45 n.4.
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fair trial. 59 However, the state never asserted a lesser included offense
argument, and the court never discussed the issue.
60
The court followed the Schuh decision with City of Fargo v.
Schwagel.6 1 In Schwagel, the defendant was charged with DUI and, at
trial, asserted that the city failed to prove the element of driving.
62
Although the complaint did not charge APC and the city never moved to
amend the complaint, the trial court found the defendant guilty of
APC.63 In reversing the conviction, the court held that the defendant
could not be charged with DUI and be convicted of a different offense.
64
The court noted that it did not hear the city's argument that APC was a
lesser included offense of DUI since that argument was not included in
the city's brief. 65 Consequently, the question of whether APC met the
lesser offense test, and qualified as a lesser included offense of DUI,
remained unanswered. 66
III. ANALYSIS
Justice Sandstrom began the majority opinion in Huber by explain-
ing that a reversal of Huber's conviction would require two findings:
First, the lower court must have erred in amending the jury instructions,
and, second, the error must not have been harmless.67 The court noted
that jury instructions "must correctly and adequately inform the jury of
the applicable law and must not mislead or confuse the jury." 68 The
court then reviewed the differences between DUI and APC.69 While DUI
59. Id. at 46.
60. See id. at 41-45 (showing the absence of a lesser included offense argument). The State's
main argument was that APC and DUI were the same offense under Rule 3(b) of the North Dakota
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 45 (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 3(b)).
61. 544 N.W.2d 873 (N.D. 1996).
62. City of Fargo v. Schwagel, 544 N.W.2d 873, 873 (N.D. 1996). The defendant waived his
right to a trial by jury and argued that the city failed to prove the element of driving. Id.
63. Id. at 873-74.
64. Id. at 874. More specifically, the defendant's constitutional right to notice of the charges
against him was violated. Id.
65. Id. at 875.
66. See id. (holding that the lesser included offense argument was not timely raised); State v.
Jacobson, 338 N.W.2d 648, 650 (N.D. 1983) (holding that a lesser included offense must satisfy both
the included offense test and the lesser offense test).
67. State v. Huber, 555 N.W.2d 791, 793 (N.D. 1996) (citing State v. Marshall, 531 N.W.2d 284,
287 (N.D. 1995)). The court also noted Huber's argument that the amended instructions added a
different offense (APC) and, thus, prejudiced his substantive rights. Id. The State asserted that Huber
"acquiesced in the instruction on APC" since he submitted a proposed APC instruction. Id. at 794.
However, the court recognized that before jury selection Huber objected to the inclusion of APC in
the jury instructions. Id.
68. Id. at 793 (quoting City of Minot v. Rubbelke, 456 N.w.2d 511, 513 (N.D. 1990)).
69. Id. at 794-95. The court reaffirmed that DUI and APC were different offenses. Id. at 794.
The "or" between DUI and APC in the statute evidenced legislative intent to create two offenses. Id.
(citing Jacobson, 338 N.W.2d at 650). In addition, the court recognized that the North Dakota
Legislature provided for suspension of APC violations but provided that no suspensions or deferrals
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requires vehicular motion, the court stated that APC only requires
"bodily restraint, directing influence, domination, or regulation" of a
vehicle. 70 Consequently, it is possible to be in actual physical control
without driving, but it is not possible to drive without being in actual
physical control. 7 ' The court also recognized that under the North
Dakota statute, APC fits the description of an included offense of DUI.72
In deciding the state's lesser included offense argument, the court
reviewed Jacobson.73 At the time of Jacobson, DUI and APC carried the
same criminal penalty and, consequently, APC did not satisfy the lesser
offense test. 74 However, after Jacobson, the North Dakota Legislature
amended the penalty portion of the statute and provided for mandatory
minimum sentences for DUI but allowed for suspension of sentences in
APC cases. 75 The court reasoned that since the penalties were "now
different," APC satisfied the lesser offense test. 76 Therefore, the court
held that APC was a lesser included offense of DUI.77 In addition, the
court stated that to the extent this holding was inconsistent with Schuh,
Schuh was overruled.78
After holding that APC was a lesser included offense of DUI, the
court noted the propriety of giving instructions on a lesser included
offense. 79 The court reasoned that a lesser included offense instruction
should be given when a jury could reasonably find a defendant guilty of
a lesser offense and not guilty of the greater offense.80 Applying its
would be allowed for DUI violations. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4)(e)(1) (1997)). The
State argued that the section on commercial drivers' licenses should control the definition of "drive."
Id. at 794 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.2 (1997)). Under that section, "drive" means "drive,
operate, or be in physical control of a motor vehicle." Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.2)).
Holding the definition of "drive" to be limited to that section, the court rejected the argument. Id.
(noting that § 39-06.2-02 limits "drive" to the commercial chapter "unless the context or subject matter
otherwise requires").
70. Id. at 795 (citing James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes Driving, Operating, or
Being in Control of a Motor Vehicle for Purposes of Driving While Intoxicated Statute or Ordinance, 93
A.L.R.3d §§ 3a-3c (1980)).
71. Id.
72. Id. APC differs from DUI in that "it constitutes a less serious harm or risk of harm to the
same person, property, or public interest." Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE §12.1-01-04(15)(c) (1997)).
The court also noted that "[b]oth the criminal rules and the criminal code use the term 'included
offense' rather than 'lesser included offense."' However, the court never explained the significance
of that difference. Id. at 796.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4)(e)(1) (1997)).
76. Id. The court reasoned that "[w]e have recognized the legally significant difference be-
tween the possibility of suspending [a] sentence and a mandatory minimum sentence." Id. (recogniz-
ing that Rule II (b)(2) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the court to inform
the defendant of any mandatory minimum sentence).
77. Id. APC now met both the included offense test and the lesser offense test. See State v.
Jacobson, 338 N.W.2d 648, 651 (N.D. 1983) (providing the two tests that a potential lesser included
offense must satisfy).
78. Huber, 555 N.W. 2d at 795.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing State v. Tweed, 491 N.W.2d 412, 414 (N.D. 1992)).
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reasoning, the court pointed out the dispute as to who was the driver of
the vehicle in the instant case.8 1 In light of this dispute, while Huber
could reasonably be found not guilty of DUI, he was very likely guilty
of APC since the officer found him behind the wheel when the car was
stopped. 82 Therefore, the evidence was such that a jury could have
reasonably found the defendant guilty of APC and not guilty of DUI.83
After determining that an instruction on APC was proper, the court
reasoned that Huber was on notice of a possible APC instruction. 84 APC
was a lesser included offense and it was appropriate in the case. 85
Therefore, Huber's constitutional right to notice of the charges against
him was satisfied. 86 The court then reviewed the jury instructions and
found that the lower court failed to include proper APC jury instructions
and verdict forms. 87 As such, the lower court erred in amending the jury
instructions, and the first required finding for reversal was met. 88
Further, the lower court allowed the jury to use either the APC standard
or the DUI standard to convict Huber of DUI.89 The court held that
instructions are not harmless error if they allow a defendant who only
committed a lesser offense to be found guilty of a greater offense. 90
Accordingly, the second required finding for reversal of Huber's
conviction was met. 91 The court subsequently reversed Huber's
conviction and remanded for a new trial. 92
8 1. Id. "Two witnesses testified Huber was not driving, and the deputy sheriff testified he was."
Id.
82. See id. (implying that Huber likely had bodily restraint (APC) over a vehicle just by sitting in
the driver's seat of a parked pickup). In a similar case, a defendant was convicted of APC after a
police officer found her in the driver's seat of a car with the engine running. See State v. Schuler, 243
N.W.2d 367, 370 (N.D. 1976). Further, North Dakota courts have consistently held that a level of con-
trol lower than Huber apparently had will suffice for an APC conviction. See Buck v. North Dakota
State Highway Comm'r, 425 N.W.2d 370, 372 (N.D. 1988) (finding an APC violation where the defen-
dant was observed in a parked car with the keys in the ignition); State v. Schwalk, 430 N.W.2d 317,
319 (N.D. 1988) (holding that "a person may be in 'actual physical control' of a vehicle ... even
though they are asleep or unconscious when found by the arresting officer").
83. Huber, 555 N.W.2d at 796.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The court noted that the Sixth Amendment gives the defendant the right "to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation." Id. (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818
(1975)). Further, conviction for a crime not charged would violate due process. Id. (citing DeJonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937)). However, "an offense charged in an Information inherently
notifies the defendant that he or she may have to defend against lesser included offenses." Id.
Therefore, the complaint notified Huber of the DUI charge and an APC charge. Id. at 797.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. The jury was instructed to return a guilty verdict on the DUI charge if it found that Huber
had operated or been in actual physical control of the vehicle. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 797-98.
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IV. IMPACT
By holding that APC is a lesser included offense of DUI, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has theoretically given North Dakota prosecutors
an advantage over defendants in most situations. Initially, a defendant
charged with DUI is put on notice that he or she may have to defend
against APC.93 In many instances, prosecutors will not have to choose
whether to try a defendant for APC or DUI. 94 The prosecutor may, in
effect, subject the defendant to both offenses by charging the defendant
with the greater offense. 95 As a result, if during the course of trial, a DUI
conviction seems unlikely, the prosecutor could concentrate on APC or
simply request proper jury instructions on APC.96
In addition, the prosecutor could gain 'an advantage in plea
bargaining. A prosecutor may frequently be permitted to 'risklessly'
charge the defendant with DUI since a DUI charge notifies the defendant
of possible APC conviction. 97 Conversely, the defendant risks conviction
for either DUI or APC and therefore might be more likely to accept an
APC conviction, even in cases where the prosecutor would have only
charged APC if no lesser included offense existed. 98 On the other hand,
93. See id. at 796 (holding that APC is a lesser included offense of DUI); State v. Vance, 537
N.W.2d 537, 548 (N.D. 1995) (holding that a defendant is put on notice of all lesser included offenses
when charged with a greater offense).
94. See Huber, 555 N.W.2d at 796 (implying that a prosecutor can try a defendant for DUI and
proceed to get a conviction for either DUI or APC if a jury instruction on APC as a lesser included
offense is appropriate).
95. Id.
96. See id. (holding that where a jury instruction on a lesser included offense is appropriate, the
jury instruction must be accurate and adequate). For example, when the prosecutor lacks evidence of
driving, the prosecutor could fall back on the APC offense. The prosecutor could then simply point out
that the defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle when found by the law enforcement
officer. See State v. Schuler, 243 N.W.2d 367, 370 (N.D. 1976) (finding the defendant guilty of APC
where the officer found her in the driver's seat of a car with its engine running).
97. See Huber, 555 N.W.2d at 797. Even if the prosecutor's case for DUI is weak, the prosecu-
tor could have the security of a possible conviction of APC as a lesser included offense. Admittedly,
an instruction on APC as a lesser included offense will be inappropriate where "the evidence would
[not] permit a jury rationally to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the
greater." See id. However, in those cases, if the prosecutor's case for DUI is weak, the prosecutor's
case would necessarily be weak for APC. In such cases, evidence of the defendant's driving would
likely be the only evidence of defendant being in actual physical control. See State v. Jacobson, 338
N.W.2d 648, 651 (N.D. 1983) (holding that regardless of whether APC qualified as a lesser included
offense of DUI, instruction on APC as a lesser included offense was inappropriate since the jury could
not reasonably acquit the defendant of DUI and convict him of APC).
98. See DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937) (holding that a defendant's constitutional
right to notice is not violated when a jury convicts him of a lesser included offense). An example is
where limited evidence of a defendant's driving exists but considerable evidence of defendant's being
in actual physical control exists. If APC was not held to be a lesser included offense of DUI
(pre-Huber), the prosecutor would have to choose either DUI or APC. The prosecutor would likely
choose APC, the stronger case. However, if the prosecutor chose DUI in an effort to urge the
defendant to accept an APC plea bargain, the defendant could "call his bluff' by rejecting the plea
bargain. If the prosecutor later sought to amend the charge to APC, the defendant could allege
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in some situations, the court's holding may benefit defendants. For
example, jurors might be more apt to find reasonable doubt of DUI
when they can convict a defendant of APC instead.99
Some professionals feel that Huber will have only limited effects. 100
Bruce D. Quick, a criminal defense attorney, reports that despite the
statutorily provided ability to suspend APC sentences, such sentences are
rarely suspended. 101 Since the criminal penalties for APC and DUI are,
in practice, identical, the significance of APC as a lesser included offense
of DUI will be minimal. 102 Quick further notes that prosecutors are
morally obligated not to overcharge and, thus, will likely benefit from
Huber solely in cases where direct evidence of actual physical control
exists but only significant circumstantial evidence of driving exists. 103 In
those rare cases, a prosecutor would have probable cause to believe that
the defendant committed DUI and an even stronger case against the
defendant for APC.104 The prosecutor could then ethically charge DUI
and, consequently, benefit from having the security of APC as a lesser
included offense.105
Regardless of the preceding theoretical and practical views, the
holding that APC is a lesser included offense of DUI will very likely play
little or no factor in some DUI and APC cases. 106 In Huber, the court
stated that a jury instruction on APC as a lesser included offense is only
appropriate when a jury could rationally find a defendant guilty of the
prejudice under Rule 3(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. See N.D. R. CIM. P.
3(b) (providing that an amendment of a complaint must not add a new offense or prejudice the defen-
dant's substantive rights). Since APC is a lesser included offense of DUI, the prosecutor could fre-
quently choose to charge the defendant with DUI. See Huber, 555 N.W.2d at 795 (N.D. 1996) (hold-
ing that APC is a lesser included offense of DUI). Further, the defendant frequently will be unable to
call his bluff since the defendant can no longer risk a DUI conviction for the possibility of no convic-
tion. See id. at 796 (providing that a defendant charged with DUI can be found guilty of the lesser
included offense of APC).
99. The jury would likely have to find the defendant not guilty of DUI before turning to APC.
See State v. Daulton, 518 N.W.2d 719, 721 (N.D. 1994) (holding that the acquittal-first jury instruction
on a lesser included offense provided the best guidance to a jury). Under the acquittal-first jury
instruction, the jury must acquit the defendant of the offense charged before considering a lesser
included offense. See id. Still, some juries could likely see APC as a way to ensure that a
"semi-culpable" defendant does not get off "scot-free."
100. Interview with Bruce D. Quick, criminal defense attorney for the Vogel Law Firm of Fargo,
N.D., in Grand Forks, N.D. (Jan. 28, 1998).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.; telephonic interview with Dave Jones, Assistant State's Attorney, Grand Forks County,
N.D. (Jan. 17, 1998). For example, a police officer may find a defendant alone in his parked car on a
secluded road. A warm engine or fresh tire tracks in snow or dirt could provide additional evidence
of the defendant's driving. Another possibility might be where an officer finds the lone defendant
changing the tire on his car on a secluded road. In such cases, one could reasonably believe that the
defendant drove his car to the parked position.
104. Quick, supra note 100.
105. Id.
106. See State v. Huber, 555 N.W.2d 791, 796 (N.D. 1996) (noting that an instruction on APC as
a lesser included offense will not always be appropriate).
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lesser offense but not the greater offense.107 Therefore, in cases where
APC instruction is inappropriate, Huber is unlikely to control.1 08 Such
cases might include situations in which a driver crashed a vehicle and was
exited or was thrown from the car, where a driver was injured so severely
that he or she could not possibly drive, where a vehicle was wrecked, and
thus, inoperable, or where a driver was pinned beneath a car. 109
V. CONCLUSION
In Huber, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (APC)
was a lesser included offense of driving a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol (DUI). In many instances, the prosecutor's ethical
obligations to not overcharge a defendant, the seemingly identical
punishments for DUI and APC offenses, and the court's requirement
that the situation be such that a jury could rationally convict the defen-
dant of APC but acquit the defendant of DUI, will likely limit the appli-
cability of Huber.llO However, in cases where a jury could rationally
find the defendant guilty of APC but not guilty of DUI, and the prosecu-
tor could ethically charge a defendant with DUI, Huber will likely
provide the prosecutor with the security of a lesser included offense to
fall back on.11
Reid Alan Brady
107. Id. Such circumstances are likely similar to, or the same as, situations where a prosecutor
has probable cause to believe that the defendant committed DUI and may establish an even stronger
case against the defendant for APC. See Quick, supra note 100. As such, in a situation where a
prosecutor could ethically charge either DUI or APC, a jury instruction on APC would likely be
appropriate. See id.
108. Huber's "secondary" holding, that an APC instruction as a lesser included offense should be
given only when appropriate, would control. See Huber, 555 N.W.2d at 796 (noting that an APC
instruction as a lesser included offense must be appropriate under the circumstances).
109. State v. Schuh might also be an example of where APC is inappropriate. See 496 N.W.2d
41, 41-46 (N.D. 1993) (suggesting a possible issue of whether the defendant, when found, was in
actual physical control of the vehicle). In Schuh, the officer found the defendant in a "stranded" car.
Id. at 42. Thus, one might argue that a stranded car is an inoperable car over which one could not
exert actual physical control. See id. But see State v. Saul, 434 N.W.2d 572, 576 (N.D. 1989)
(rejecting the defendant's argument that the "high-centered" position of his car precluded a finding of
actual physical control).
110. See Quick, supra note 100 (discussing the prosecutor's obligation not to overcharge, and the
practical similarity of APC and DUI sentences); Huber, 555 N.W.2d at 796 (noting that an APC
instruction as a lesser included offense must be appropriate under the circumstances).
111. See Huber, 555 N.W.2d at 796 (asserting that an APC instruction as a lesser included of-
fense must be appropriate under the circumstances); Quick, supra note 100 (discussing the prosecu-
tor's obligation to not overcharge).
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